Abstract In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset and counter-party risks are treated separately and the banks hedge their assets risks by appropriate OTC contracts. In his model, each bank has only two counter-party neighbors, a bank fails due to the counter-party risk only if at least one of its two neighbors default, and such a counter-party risk is a low probability event. Informally, the author shows that the banks will hedge their asset risks by appropriate OTC contracts, and, though it may be socially optimal to insure against counterparty risk, in equilibrium banks will not choose to insure this low probability event.
nomic stability is as having an unstable economy can pave way to an economic crisis each time when the global markets sees a downward trend. Financial instability and its effects on the economy can be very costly due to its contagion or spillover effects to other parts of the economy and it is fundamental to have a sound, stable and healthy financial system to support the efficient allocation of resources and distribution of risks across the economy. Financial risk management is a critical component of maintaining economic stability. Hedging is a risk management option that protects the owner of an asset from loss. It is the process of shifting risks to the futures market. The risks in the market must be first identified in order to manage the risk. To identify the risk one must examine both the immediate risk (asset risk) as well as the risk due to indirect effects (counter-party risk). Though hedging will minimize overall profit when markets are moving positive, it also helps in reducing risk during undesirable market conditions. However, as the owner hedges his/her asset risk to protect against defaults, the owner also gets exposed to the counter-party risk.
In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset and counter-party risks are treated separately, and showed that, under certain situations, banks do not manage counter-party risk in equilibrium. In his model, each bank has only two counter-party neighbors, a bank fails due to the counter-party risk only if at least one of its two neighbors default, and such a counter-party risk is an event with low probability. Informally, the author shows that the banks will hedge their asset risks by appropriate OTC contracts, and, though it may be socially optimal for banks to insure against counter-party risk, in equilibrium banks will not choose to insure this low probability event. The OTC contract not only creates a contagion but also creates externalities which undermines the incentives of the banks to avert contagion. The model uses short term debt to finance their real asset. The failure in this model is from the liability side, where the investors run on the banks when they do not trust the bank, i.e., the investors do not roll over the debts of the banks. Hence the contagion can be avoided only by increasing the equity and not by providing liquidity.
In this paper, we consider the above model for more general network topologies, namely when each node has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some integer r > 0. We extend the analysis of [1] to show that as the number of counter-party neighbors increase the probability of counter-party risk also increases 1 , and in particular, the socially optimal solution becomes privately sustainable when each bank hedges its risk to a sufficiently large number of other banks. The counter-party risk can be hedged by holding more equity, buying default insurance on their counterparties or collateralizing OTC contracts. Since holding excess capital or collateralizing OTC contracts is a wasteful use of scarce capital [1] , when the banks choose to hedge their counter-party risk they buy the default insurance on their counterparties. More precisely, our conclusions for the general case of 2r neighbors are as follows:
• All the banks will still decide to hedge their asset risks. 1 Thus, the owners will decide to hedge their counter-party risk thereby helping to contain an economic crisis.
• If the number of counter-party neighbors is at least n /2, then all banks will decide to insure their counter-parties, and socially optimal solution in case of two counter-parties for each bank now becomes privately optimal solution. • In the limit when the number of banks n in the network tend to ∞, as the number of counter-party neighbors approach n − 1, failure of very few of its counter-party banks will not affect a bank.
Related Prior Research Works
As we have already mentioned, Zawadowski [1] introduced a banking model in which asset risk and counter-party risk are treated separately, showed that banks always prefer to hedge their asset risk using OTC contracts and also showed that banks do not hedge their counter-party risk even though hedging counter-party risk is possible and socially desirable. Allen and Gale [23] showed that interbank deposits help banks share liquidity risk but expose them to asset losses if their counterparty defaults. Their model cannot be used to understand the contractual choices in case of OTC derivatives as they modeled the liquidity risk. Babus [18] proposed a model in which links are formed between banks which serves as an insurance mechanism to reduce the risk of contagion. Allen and Babus [12] pointed out that graph-theoretic concepts provide a conceptual framework used to describe and analyze the banking network, and showed that more interbank links provide banks with a form of coinsurance against uncertain liquidity flows. Gai and Kapadi [5] showed that more interbank links increase the opportunity for spreading failures to other banks during crisis. Several prior researchers such as [11, 12, 17, 21] commented that graph-theoretic frameworks may provide a powerful tool for analyzing stability of banking and other financial networks. Kleindorfer et al. [11] argued that network analyses can play a crucial role in understanding many important phenomena in finance. Freixas et al. [24] explored the case of banks that face liquidity fluctuations due to the uncertainty about consumers withdrawing funds. Iazzetta and Manna [13] analysed the monthly data on deposit exchange to understand the spread of liquidity crisis using network topology. Babus [20] studied how the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of being linked changes depending on the network structure and observed that, when the network is maximal, liquidity can be redistributed in the system to make the risk of contagion minimal. Corbo and Demange [6] explored the relationship of the structure of interbank connections to the contagion risk of defaults given the exogenous default of set of banks. Nier et al. [17] explored the dependency of systemic risks on the structure of the banking system via network theoretic approach and the resilience of such a system to contagious defaults. Haldane [13] suggested that contagion should be measured based on the interconnectedness of each institution within the financial system. Liedorp et al. [8] investigated if interconnectedness in the interbank market is a channel through which banks affect each others riskiness, and argued that both large lending and borrowing shares in interbank markets increase the riskiness of banks active in the dutch banking market. Kiyotaki and Moore [26] studied the chain reaction caused by the shock in one firm and the financial difficulties in other firms due to this chain reaction. Acharya and Bisin [14] compared centralized markets to OTC markets and showed that counter-party risk externalities can lead to excessive default and production of aggregate risk. Caballero and Simsek [16] concluded that OTC derivatives are not the sole reason for the inefficiency of financial networks. Pirrong [15] argued that central counter-parties (CCP) can also increase the systemic risk under certain circumstances and hence the introduction of CCP will not guarantee to mitigate the systemic risk. Zawadowski [7] showed that complicated interwoven financial intermediation can be a reason for inefficient financial networks, and hence OTC are not the only reason for financial instability. Stulz [9] showed that exchange trading has both benefits and costs compared to OTC trading, and argued that credit default swaps (CDS) did not cause the crisis since they worked well during much of the first year of the crisis. Zhu and Pykhtin [19] showed that modeling credit exposures is vital for risk management application, while modelling credit value adjustment (CVA) is necessary step for pricing and hedging counter-party credit risk. Corbo and Demange [6] showed that introduction of central clearing house for credit default swaps will mitigate the counter-party risk. Gandhi et al. [4] paralleled and complemented the conclusion of [6] , i.e., the creation of central clearing house for CDS contracts may not reduce the counter-party risk.
The basic model
The model has n > 3 banks and three time periods t = 0, 1, 2 termed as initial, interim and final, respectively. Each bank has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some integer r > 0 (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). The unit investment of each bank in the long term real asset yields a return of R +
, and each ε k is realized at t = 2 taking values of u or −u each with probability 1 /2. For each unit investment made by the bank at t = 0, the investor lends D ≥ 0 as short term debt and equity 1 − D ≥ 0 is the bank's share. The short term debt has to be rolled over at time period t = 1 for the banks to operate successfully. Thus the debt holders have an option to withdraw funding and force the bank to liquidate the real project. Let e ∈ {0, 1} be the unobservable effort choice such that a bank needs to exert an effort of e = 1 at both time period t = 0 and t = 1 for the project to be successful (i.e., R = R H ). At t = 1 the project can be in one of the two states: a "bad" state with probability p or a "good" state with probability 1 − p, irrespective of the effort exerted by the bank. At a "bad" state the project of one of the randomly chosen bank fails and delivers R L , even if e = 1 at both time periods t = 0 and t = 1. Unless the bank demand collateral from its counter-parties, if the bank defaults at t = 1 then all the hedging liabilities of the defaulted bank gets cancelled, the investors liquidate the bank and take equal share of L (the value of the bank when it is liquidated). If the bank survives till t = 2 and the counter-party risk gets realized then, the bank has to settle the counter-party hedging contract before paying its debt.
We use the following notations for four specific values of the probability of bad state p: 
Parameter Restrictions and Assumptions
The following parameter restriction are adopted from [1] to make them consistent for a network model with 2r counter-parties. B is the banks' private benefit with the subscript representing the specific time period and X denotes the additional nonpledgable payoff. Inequality (1) ensures that the investors will choose to roll over the debt at t = 1 when the project is expected to succeed (i.e., R = R H ), and the investors will decide to liquidate the bank at t = 1 if the bank's project is expected to fail (i.e., R = R L ). Inequality (2) implies that it is socially optimal to exert effort. Inequality (3) ensures that banks have to keep positive equity to overcome moral hazard. Inequality (4) ensures that, counter-party risk of the bank is large enough to lead to contagion but small enough that the bank does not want to engage in risk-shifting.
Our Results
Our results imply that when the number of counter-party neighbors is at least n /2, the socially optimal outcome become privately sustainable. Theorem 1(a) is proved in Lemma 5, whereas Theorem 1(c),(e),(f) are showed in Lemma 6. Theorem 1(d) follows from the derivations of parameter values as described in Section 4.1; these derivations follow from the work in [1] and are provided in the appendix. Theorem 1(b) uses the same proof as that in [1] and is therefore omitted.
Proofs of Theorem 1
The derivations of the parameters and their values described in items (I) -(VIII) below follow from the work in [1] since they are not affected by changing the number of counter-party neighbors from 2 to 2r. For the sake of completeness, these derivations are provided in the appendix.
(I) The maximum amount of borrowing at t = 0 that can be roll over at t = 1 is given by:
and the expected payoff of the above bank borrowing D max is B 1 . (II) In a stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance, the price per unit of default insurance is
(where the superscript "safe" denotes the insured system). (III) In a stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance, the amount borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project is
In a contagious system where banks decide not to buy insurance, the amount borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project is
In a contagious system where banks decide not to buy insurance, the interest rate for the amount borrowed is for a bank's benefit to outweigh the cost of its counter-party insurance).
Proof. The private incentive of a single bank to stay insured instead of deviating from counter-party insurance is when the following holds (in the left-hand side of the inequality, the first term is the payoff if no bank defaults, the second term is the payoff if any of the counter-parties of the bank default, the third term is money invested to buy the insurance on the bank's counter-parties and the fourth term is the bank's equity):
benefits from all banks being insured ≥ benefits from all but one bank not being insured
(Informally, Lemma 2 states that the probability of bad state must be at most p soc =
the social benefits to outweigh the social cost of its counterparty insurance).
Proof. The social benefits outweigh the social cost of the counter-party insurance of the system if and only if the following holds:
benefits from all banks being insured ≥ benefits from no bank being insured
and thus
Corollary 1. If each bank has only two counter-parties then r = 1 and thus p
.
Lemma 3 (Probability of failure in risky autarky).
p r.aut = (1 − β) n n − 1 X 1 − 2r! 2 2r r K=0 1 K! (2r − K)! R H + X − L − B 1 (1 − β) − (nβ − 1)X n − 1        1 − 2r! 2 2r r K=0 1 K! (2r − K)!       
(An informal explanation of Lemma 3 is as follows. If a bank has enough equity to survive even if all of its counter-parties collapse then the bank may be forced to borrow less and this is not profitable. But, if the bank decides to deviate to risky autarky then it cannot pay back its debt if the real project delivers R H − 2ru. The probability of failure if the bank chooses risky autarky is given by
Proof. For a bank to be in risky autarky, they borrow less such that it can roll over the debt at t = 1 if its neighbors collapse but need not survive at t = 2. The relevant incentive constraint is:
The break-even condition for investors at t = 0 is:
A bank decides not to deviate to risky autarky in a contagious system if and only if the following holds: payoff in contagious system ≥ payoff in risky autarky
Corollary 2. If the number of neighbors is 2 then r = 1 and thus
Lemma 4 (Probability of failure in safe autarky).
(An informal explanation of Lemma 4 is as follows. If a bank chooses to deviate to safe autarky, it will survive unless it is directly affected by low return R L . It can pay back its debt even if the real project delivers R H −2ru. The probability of failure if the bank chooses safe autarky is given by p
).
Proof. Suppose that a bank survives at t = 2 even if all of its counter-party risks are realized to ensure that the payoff of the real project is R H − 2ru. Since the bank needs enough equity to survive even if real project yields R H − 2ru, we have
Banks do not deviate to safe autarky from contagious system if and only if the following holds:
payoff in contagious system ≥ payoff in safe autarky
If the number of neighbors is 2 then r = 1 and thus
Lemma 5. In equilibrium banks hedge all of its counter-party risks i.e. banks endogenously enter into OTC contracts.
Proof. The banks hedge all of its counter-party risks if and only if payoff from hedging in contagious equilibrium > payoff from not hedging
which satisfies inequality (4), and thus banks hedge all of its counter-party risks.
Let the returns from the successful project be R H +
that the bank goes bankrupt at t = 2 if the counter-party realization of its unhedged risk is −u. This is true if the bank cannot repay its debt at t = 2, i.e.,
if a bank fails when it loses −u on its unhedged counter-party exposure, it will fail when the loss is greater than −u on its unhedged counter-party exposure. ⊓ ⊔
Corollary 4.
If number of counter-party neighbors is 2 (i.e., r = 1), then Proof. If a bank borrows D max (R l,0 ) at t = 0 and if the bank has a low expected realization of R L , then the debt financing is not rolled over at t = 1. Since R L < L, the creditors will want to terminate the project. The bank goes bankrupt if its debt financing is not rolled over at t = 1.
If 2r, the number of counter-party neighbors, is less than n /2, then probability of failure due to counter-party risk is less than n /2 n , i.e., the probability of counter-party risk is less than 1 /2. Since we assume that banks will consider a counter party risk probability of at least 1 /2 to insure against counter-party risk, banks do not insure against counter-party risk using default insurance when 2r < n /2. When 2r ≥ n /2, the probability of counter-party risk becomes at least 1 /2 and hence banks will hedge the counter-party risk. The counter-party insurance payoff happens with probability 2rp n in case of private perspective and with probability (n−1)p n in case of social perspective. Thus, as 2r increases to n − 1, the counter-party insurance payoff probability in private perspective becomes the same as that in social perspective.
When 2r ≥ n /2, the individual banks will hedge the counter-party risk by taking counter-party insurance. When 2r < n /2, banks will not hedge the counter-party risk and hence failure of a counter-party will lead to the violation of its incentive constraint, thus the bank shirks and the project delivers R L . Let D 1 be the amount of debt to be rolled over at t = 1. The investors will demand higher interest rate R ı,1 in order to break even. Let P s be the probability of a bank that do not default, P f be the probability of a bank that defaults, and n d be the number of neighbors of any bank that default. Thus, P s = 2r − n d 2r and P f = n d 2r . By the break even condition of investors, we get
The incentive constraint is
If the bank had originally borrowed D 0 , the amount it has to roll over at t = 1 is R ı,0 D 0 = R H + X − B 1 , but the amount that is actually getting rolled over is only 
Appendix 1: Remaining Proofs
The incentive constraint of a bank surviving at t = 1 and holding no risk can be written as follows:
payoff if bank exerts effort ≥ payoff if bank does not exert effort
Assume all counter parties are insured. The insurance company has to hold a capital of 2RI. If all the banks insure against the failure of their counter-parties, the insurance fund breaks even if the price per unit of the default insurance s is determined by the break even condition. Using the superscript safe to denote the insured system, we get expected amount that remains in the insurance fund at t = 2 = amount that insurance fund has to set aside at t = 0 e : the unobservable effort choice made by the bank (e ∈ {0, 1}). 
The maximum amount of borrowing at t = 0 that can be rolled over at t = 1.
The price per unit of default insurance in a stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance.
The amount borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project in a stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance.
The amount borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project in a contagious system where banks decide not to buy insurance.
